Power system balancing with high renewable penetration : the potential of demand response by Critz, David Karl
Power System Balancing with High Renewable Penetration:




Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1997
Submitted to the Engineering Systems Division
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OFTECHNOLOGY
MAR 0 8 2012
LBRARIES
ARCHIVES
Master of Science in Management and Engineering
at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
September 2011
C2011 David Karl Critz. All rights reserved.
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and distribute publicly paper
and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part in any medium now




Certified by: Stephen ConnorsStephen Connors
Director, Analysis Group for Regional Energy Alternatives, MIT Energy Initiative




Director, System Design & Management
Acknowledgements
Thanks to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory for its support through the Joint
Institute for Strategic Energy Analysis.
Thanks to K&K. You were always there for me.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ...................................................................................... 7
2 Background ....................................................................................... 8
2.1 Demand Response ................................................................................ 8
2.1.1 The Business of Demand Response .................................................................. 9
2.1.2 L oad C lipping ................................................................................................. 10
2.1.3 L oad Shifting................................................................................................. 12
2.1.4 Price R esponse .............................................................................................. 13
2.2 Rolling Stochastic Unit Commitment ...................................................... 15
2.2.1 WILMAR Results .......................................................................................... 17
2.2.2 WILMAR and Demand Response ................................................................. 17
3 Method ........................................................................................ 19
3.1 Modeling Assumptions........................................................................19
3.2 WILMAR Operations .......................................................................... 22
3.3 Modeling Demand Response.................................................................23
3.4 Parameter: Demand Response Quantity ................................................... 23
3.5 Parameter: Demand Response Price ........................................................ 24
4 Results.......................................................................................... 26
4.1 Baseline: Stochastic Optimization with No Demand Response ...................... 26
4.1.1 Evaluation M etrics .......................................................................................... 27
4.1.2 Wind Harvesting ............................................................................................ 28
4.1.3 Thermal Unit Performance ............................................................................ 31
4.2 Single Result with Demand Response.........................................................35
4.3 Demand Response Parametric Search - Price & Quantity ............................. 41
4.4 Business Impact....................................................................................51
4.4.1 Pricing Demand Response Capacity................................................................51
4.4.2 Effect of Demand Response on Electricity Price .............................................. 54
4.4.3 Effect of Demand Response upon Wind Generator Profit ................................ 56
4.4.4 Effect of Demand Response on Coal Generator Profit ..................................... 57
4.4.5 Effect of Demand Response upon Natural Gas Generator Profit ...................... 58
5 Conclusions ................................................................................... 59
6 References ...................................................................................... 61
Table of Figures
Figure 2-1: Illustration of demand response load clipping ....................................... 11
Figure 2-2: Illustration of demand response load shifting ......................................... 13
Figure 3-1: Electrical demand and wind, Winter .................................................... 20
Figure 3-2: Average electrical demand and wind supply by hour, all seasons ............ 21
Figure 3-3: Load-duration curve, 8 selected weeks of 52 ......................................... 21
Figure 4-1: Winter generation profile, stochastic baseline....................................... 26
Figure 4-2: Wind forecasting and wind curtailment, stochastic optimization ........... 29
Figure 4-3: Consolidated view of wind forecasting and curtailment......................... 30
Figure 4-4: Load profile, coal unit, no demand response ......................................... 32
Figure 4-5: Load profile, multiple coal units, no demand response ........................... 33
Figure 4-6: Load profile, multiple natural gas units, no demand response ................. 34
Figure 4-7: Generation mix, with demand response................................................ 35
Figure 4-8: Demand response calls by time of day, wind and no wind...................... 36
Figure 4-9: System cost, with and without demand response.................. 37
Figure 4-10: Wind harvesting with demand response.............................................. 38
Figure 4-11: Load profile, coal unit, with demand response .................................... 39
Figure 4-12: Load profiles, coal class, with demand response................................... 40
Figure 4-13: Load profiles, natural gas class, with demand response ....................... 40
Figure 4-14: Demand response experimental space................................................ 42
Figure 4-15: System operation cost with demand response................... 43
Figure 4-16: Demand response price and customer impact....................................... 44
Figure 4-17: Demand response impact and system cost........................................... 45
Figure 4-18: Demand response and wind energy .................................................... 46
Figure 4-19: Demand response and SO2 ................................. . .. ... .. .. .. ... .. ... .. .. ... .. . . . 47
Figure 4-20: Demand response and CO2.................................. .. ... .. .. .. ... .. ... .. .. ... .. .. . . 47
Figure 4-21: Demand response and coal energy fraction ......................................... 48
Figure 4-22: Demand response and natural gas energy contribution ......................... 49
Figure 4-23: Demand response capacity price......................................................... 53
Figure 4-24: System operator's demand curve for DR capacity ................. 54
Figure 4-25: Effect of demand response upon day-ahead electricity prices ............... 55
Figure 4-26: Effect of demand response upon intra-day electricity prices ................. 55
Figure 4-27: Impact of demand response upon wind generator profit and production .. 56
Figure 4-28: Impact of demand response upon coal generator profit and production.... 57
Figure 4-29: Impact of demand response upon natural gas generator profit.............. 58
Table of Tables
Table 2-1: Rolling Unit Commitment Example........................................................ 17
Table 3-1: Selected Technical Capabilities of Generators......................................... 19
Table 3-2: Technical capabilities of demand response............................................. 23
Table 4-1: System operation evaluation criteria, no demand response ..................... 27
Table 4-2: Electrical load factors of generators, no demand response ....................... 31
Table 4-3: System operation evaluation criteria, with demand response ........... 41
Table 4-4: Survey results, ratepayer compensation for disconnections (Lassen and
Jensen 2005)................................................................................................... 50
Table 4-5: System operation evaluation criteria, with demand response ................... 51
Table F-1: System operation evaluation criteria, with perfect information................ 70
Power System Balancing with High Renewable Penetration:
The Potential of Demand Response
by
D. Karl Critz
Submitted to the Engineering Systems Division
on September 7, 2011 in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Management and Engineering
ABSTRACT
This study investigated the ability of responsive demand to stabilize the electrical grid
when intermittent renewable resources are present. The WILMAR stochastic unit
commitment model was used to represent a version of the Danish electricity and heat
system with an enhanced level of wind generation. The study found that demand
response reduced the marginal operating cost of the electrical system 3%. Demand
response reduced C0 2/S0 2 emissions levels 3% by enabling 11% more generation of
wind power. Demand resources representing 25% of nameplate wind power and priced
at 150% of a gas turbine's marginal cost were a recommended combination that balanced
maximum system improvement at minimal ratepayer impact. The system cost benefits
of each study case enabled the calculation of a demand curve representing the system
operator's willingness to pay fixed costs for capacity from the pool of operating savings.
With demand response, wind generators increased profits, coal plants reduced profits
slightly, and natural gas plant profit was cut to almost zero. With high levels of
unpredictable renewable resources and limited ability to import power, demand response
represents a promising technique to balance the grid at low cost.
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1 Introduction
The fundamental assumptions of the electric grid have remained mostly unchanged
since its inception. An increased emphasis on renewable generation and new
technologies are changing the way that utilities, regulators, and ratepayers will have to
think about the system. Our Edison-era operating mindset assumes that demand is a
given and that generation units can be scheduled ahead of time. Operating a system with
significant amounts of unpredictable power from wind, sun, and other renewables will
require new assumptions and tools. This study investigates the system benefits of
modifying demand for electricity in response to changing wind conditions.
The utility industry developed "demand response" (DR) to help the system remain
balanced in case of emergencies or extreme operating conditions. When demand is in
danger of exceeding supply, the system operator has the option of reducing demand as
well as increasing supply. In regions with significant electric heating, this will happen
predictably in the winter months. Integration of renewable resources has the potential to
create more times of system unbalance; if the wind does not blow as hard as predicted,
the supply could decrease at any time. A traditional but expensive solution to the
"intermittency" problem is to keep a pool of responsive generators operating at a low
power level, ready to increase production to meet the lost wind power. Alternatively, the
system could achieve balance by reducing load. Demand response is a quick-acting and
controllable "generator". This study models the ability of demand response to respond to
changing renewable power levels and ensure system balance.
A system operator needs to answer two fundamental questions about demand response
as a resource: "how much?" and "when/how long?" Each power system will have a
certain number of customers ready to reduce load, which can be thought of as a quantity
of available demand response. The system operator must also decide when to dispatch
the resource. By assigning a price for using the resource, an optimization can determine
the ideal times and durations to call upon demand response. These two parameters
(quantity and price) will influence system's cost, emissions, and reliability. The goal of
the study is to quantify the relationship between demand response impact upon
ratepayers and system operations. This can be used as an input to a policy or behavioral
economics study to determine the optimal level of demand response.
The primary objective of this paper is to study the ability of demand response to
encourage improved wind harvesting through system optimization. This will be
investigated by modeling the Danish electrical grid and quantifying its behavior under a
set of demand response quantities and prices.
2 Background
This investigation models the power system of Denmark, a nation with high penetration
of wind power. The model is built on the principle of "rolling stochastic unit
commitment", a system robust to unpredictable inputs. The experiment adds demand
response to the model. This section will provide background on both (2.1) demand
response and (2.2) rolling stochastic unit commitment.
2.1 Demand Response
The Department of Energy defines demand response as (Department of Energy 2006):
Changes in electric usage by end-use customers from their normal
consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity over
time, or to incentive payments designed to induce lower electricity use at
times ofhigh wholesale market prices or when system reliability is
jeopardized.
Demand response may be managed directly by a utility or it may be administered by a
third-party curtailment service provider (CSP). This investigation focuses on second half
of the equation, in which ratepayers agree to reduce consumption during a time of high
demand or an emergency. This response substitutes for high-cost peaking generation on
a timescale of minutes to hours. The paper will not focus on long-term efficiency
improvements, which substitute for baseload power and operate on a timescale of days
to years.
Demand response enables a regional power system to run more efficiently. Demand
resources can react very quickly (10 minutes using automation), have negligible startup
costs, and have no minimum operating level. A peaking power plant, on the other hand,
requires time and fuel to start up or must be kept operating at a low level for fast
response. Without demand response, the optimization must keep units running at an
inefficiently low output level or must incur startup costs for an uneconomically short
duration of operation. Even without intermittent renewable resources on the grid,
demand response stabilizes the system by offering a pool of highly-responsive resources
that require little early decision-making. The remaining thermal units can then operate
closer to their optimal efficiency levels or stay shut down. With intermittent resources,
the value flexible demand response increases even more. The system's reserve and
ancillary services requirements climb as the grid prepares for events that amount to
frequent unplanned plant shutdowns. Demand response reduces unplanned curtailment
of wind resources and enables thermal plants to run more efficiently, reducing costs
system-wide.
2.1.1 The Business of Demand Response
Curtailment service providers arrange demand reductions for emergencies or other
demand events with Independent System Operators (ISO). CSPs aggregate a pool of
medium- to large-sized commercial customers (typically exceeding 200kW of load)
willing to curtail and bids this capacity on the ISO markets. Customers receive a
payment for the actual curtailed demand and are penalized for failing to curtail.
Customers also get a participation payment for remaining ready to reduce demand. The
CSP is a middleman between the customer, taking curtailment orders from the ISO and
making the necessary changes at the customer site. The fastest responses stem from use
of direct load control (DLC) software and hardware. Slower curtailment is handled
manually as the provider calls the customer on the phone and requests a load drop
within a fixed amount of time. The balance between supply and demand on the grid is
then restored without any additional generation capacity.
Event-based curtailment has been used for decades in vertically integrated utilities.
Utilities would contract with large customers to offer a lower electricity rate if the
customer would agree to reduce load during a contingency, subject to penalties for
failure to act. Interest in these interruptible/curtailable tariffs dropped when utilities
were unbundled; generators, transmission agencies, and distributors had little incentive
to solve systematic problems of availability. Bids of reduced load into supply markets are
the restructured incarnation of these tariff programs.
The CSP business model funds itself through a percentage of incentive payments. CSPs
such as Energy Curtailment Specialists, EnerNOC, CPower, Innoventive, Energy
Spectrum, and Integrys Energy typically shoulder the cost of equipment installation
upfront and do not charge customers a fee to participate. CSPs do not typically publish
their provider/customer payment split, but it can be inferred from public documents.
EnerNOC's annual report (EnerNOC 2009) shows $191M in revenue and $104M in cost
of revenues. The company admits that cost of revenues consists mostly of payments to
customers, though the figure also includes metering infrastructure and monitoring costs.
If $9M of cost of revenues is devoted to this overhead, it implies a typical 50/50 split of
benefits between the CSP and its customer. With 3566MW under management, each
MW is worth $50k annually in reserve and incentive payments. A CSP helps customers
capture this value and retains a portion.
Service providers also provide price response services. CPower offers customers on a
fixed-price contract the ability to register a "strike price" at which the customer is willing
to curtail load. Notification can be based on day-ahead or spot markets. The CSP bids
this strike price into the market as a supply resource, then notifies the customer to curtail
if the bid is accepted. The ISO pays at the market rate for curtailed load and the CSP
funds operations from a portion of the payment. This is only available in regions with a
"demand bidding" infrastructure.
CSPs target medium and large commercial as well as industrial customers. Each site's
power consumption is large as compared to residential customers, so the installation of
equipment and use of staff time is invested into more power per site. A study of different
business types (ISO-NE 2005) showed that manufacturing and education/government
sites had the greatest elasticity of substitution due to flexibility in operations. Sites with
customer-facing operations such as retail and those with mission-critical operations such
as health care show the lowest ability to shift load. Few CSPs have attempted to enter
the residential market, though some operate in large multi-family buildings. Due to scale
of opportunity and investment per curtailable Watt, C&I customers remain the lifeblood
of the CSP industry.
Competition for CSPs comes from a variety of sources. Utilities (especially vertically
integrated ones) operate their own interruptible tariff programs for large industrial
customers. Utilities and advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) companies automate
equipment shutdown through direct load control (DLC). CSPs perform the same
function and are therefore in direct competition with peaking generation, transmission
towers, and other incumbent infrastructure. Simple apathy is also a conceptual
competitor; with low power prices customers have little incentive to reduce loads.
Curtailment has its place in this ecosystem, but must work to distinguish itself on its
unique features.
There are three conceptual modes of demand response: (2.1.2) load clipping, (2.1.3) load
shifting, and (2.1.4) price response.
2.1.2 Load Clipping
Load clipping occurs when a load is reduced from the system and is not replaced. If a
building manager disables escalators or a storeowner reduces lighting during a demand
event, that energy is not used at another time. Some larger customers may activate
emergency generators rather than curtail energy use. Faruqui (2009) shows that in 15
limited-scale experiments demand response was able to reduce aggregate consumption
by 13-36%. Tests that included some sort of automatic monitoring and shutoff
technology reported the strongest results. King (2005) studied incentive-based reliability
programs and concluded that they reduce total consumption by 0.2% on average,
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Figure 2-1: Illustration of demand response load clipping
Load clipping can be modeled as a fast-start generator. End-use customers receive an
incentive payment when they are called to reduce demand. This payment is considered
part of the marginal cost of running the resource, rather like fuel cost for a natural gas
turbine.
Demand response is unlike a fully-dispatchable generator in that its response is not
entirely predictable. A good curtailment services provider will manage response actively
and deliver a load reduction very close to that requested by the ISO. It is not unusual to
see response rates within 1% of the target (FERC 2009). ISOs accustomed to dealing
with near-perfect dispatchabilty of resources are still becoming comfortable with a
statistical resource such as DR.
The second aspect that differentiates demand response from a gas turbine is that its
duration is limited. Once activated, a thermal generator can theoretically run until its
fuel is exhausted. Demand resources are limited in the length of time that they can be
used. End-use customers are limited in their willingness and ability to defer or curtail
their energy use. Eventually, buildings will become uncomfortable and need to be cooled
again. The water treatment plant will have to resume pumping.
The issues of less-predictable capacity and limited duration mean that ISOs impose
varying rules about the participation of demand response:
NYISO operates the Special Case Resources program (NYISO 2010), which requires
a 4-hour 100kW reduction on 2 hours of notification. NYISO also maintains an
Emergency Demand Response Program (NYISO 2008) in which reductions are
voluntary in exchange for incentive payments. There is no recurring capacity
payment since reductions are not considered firm.
- ISO New England's Real Time Demand and Profiled Response program requires 30-
minute notification and curtailment duration of 2 hours. Incentive payments are the
real time price with a $.50/kWh floor. Capacity payments follow the ICAP market
price (ISO NE 2005). A typical capacity payment is $14/kW-month from the Winter
Supplemental Program. (ISO NE 2009)
- Demand resources compete equally in PJM's forward capacity market and
Synchronized Reserves Market. The frequency regulation market is also open to
demand response, though rules prevent it from representing more than 25% of the
available capacity in certain regions. There were 4.6GW of capacity available in
2008-2009. (PJM 2010)
- ERCOT's "Load acting as a Resource" (LaaR) program was one of the first to
recognize demand response as an ancillary service. In 2008 the program registered
139 sites. Though rated capacity is 2016MW, planned participation is capped at
1150MW to recognize variable response rates. Participation rules were changed in
2007 to require certification and testing, which has improved performance. (Wattles
2008)
- California ISO (California ISO 2010) is drafting regulations to allow demand resource
participation in ancillary services markets. These proposed rules relax requirements
specifically for demand. Examples include reducing the continuous energy
requirement, clarifying timing definitions, and halving the minimum capacity
requirement.
Academically, it is practical to model load clipping demand response as a generator.
Real-world operations are converging toward this view, but unpredictable response and
limited duration are causing system operators to move cautiously.
2.1.3 Load Shifting
Load shifting occurs when a load is removed from the system during a demand event
and is added at another time. A hotel may do its laundry at off-peak hours. A water
utility may halt pumping and rely on reservoirs for a time. A water heater or air
conditioner may be shut off during a time of high demand, then re-activate afterwards
and use extra energy to restore its thermal state. Load shifting must not be entirely post-
facto; with advance notice a building manager may expend extra energy before an event
to pre-cool the air. Borenstein (2005) constructs a set of models that predict total energy
consumption actually rises 2% with strong demand response. Holland (2005) similarly
reports that a pilot demand response program in PJM increased average load. With load
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Figure 2-2: Illustration of demand response load shifting
Load shifting can be modeled as a form of storage. Curtailment "discharges" the
available storage. Increased usage outside the event call will "charge" the storage.
Livengood (2010) models responsive demand as storage, including constraints for
temporal proximity of charging and discharging. Andersen et all (2006) model Danish
demand response as 100% load shifting with the "Balmorel" unit commitment model.
The virtual "storage" discharges during the day and charges at night, lowering and
raising prices respectively. With no price associated with dispatching the resource, the
authors find that it is either charging or discharging almost all hours of the week.
Treating demand response as storage implicitly acknowledges the duration constraint of
load as a resource. If customers can curtail 100MW for 2 hours, they represent 200MWh
of storage. The storage can be called at 50MW for 4 hours (or any other combination),
but must then wait until the deferred load is consumed before the resource can be called
again.
Due to the strength of the research suggesting rebound effects and the simplicity with
which a storage model addresses duration constraints, this investigation primarily treats
demand response as a load-shifting resource.
2.1.4 Price Response
Price response uses dynamic pricing and elastic demand to elicit a combination of load
clipping and load shifting. Rather than explicitly dispatching demand resources from an
ISO, ratepayers alter their consumption patterns as prices change. Electric customers
may be exposed to a real-time price (PNNL 2007) or a day-ahead price (EDF 2009).
Experiments have established parameters for elasticity of demand under these pricing
conditions (Faruqui and Sergici 2009). Market pricing internalizes many of the activities
of a Curtailment Service Provider and provides many of the same results. Real-time
pricing can have direct influence on wind integration. Sioshansi and Short (2009) find
that price signals can smooth load and balance the system in response to spikes in wind
levels.
Customers on flat-rate plans are currently charged according to the average cost of use in
a given month. A user who runs an air conditioner during peak times is consuming an
expensive resource below cost. The user who runs a laundry dryer at night is paying
above-market prices for electricity consumed. Dynamic prices seek to end cross-subsidies
and incentivize virtuous behavior. This idea is powerful and simple, but requires a new
set of regulations, technology, and assumptions.
Dynamic pricing has 3 different forms, but this discussion will predominantly consider
"real-time pricing" (RTP).
- Time of use pricing does not gather actual market data but rather charges users based
on historical average prices at a certain type of day. This has simpler metering
requirements since 2-way communication is not required between the retailer and
customer. Historical trends rarely reflect actual market need, especially in a contingency
event. As time of use pricing does not reflect actual market conditions, it is receiving
little academic or practical interest.
* Critical peak pricing imposes a higher tariff during times of need, be it a standard
capacity issue or a contingency. The time scale may use the day-ahead or real time
market prices to trigger the event. This model has been implemented in France with a
simple day-ahead indicator on the meter. Meters require 2-way communication, but can
use simple data transmission.
- Real time pricing exposes the customer to the actual spot price of electricity at any
given time. This requires complicated meters with advanced display capabilities.
The potential peak reduction achievable with dynamic pricing dwarfs that of
curtailment. FERC (2009) estimates that by 2019, pricing-based demand response could
represent almost 150GW in peak load reduction in the United States. This compares to a
50GW potential for all other forms of demand response combined.
The role of customer price responsiveness is a key factor to the success of dynamic
pricing. The differentiator of many advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) or "smart
meter" designs is the manner in which customers are informed of price swings. The
simplest meters may not communicate at all; the customer is left to guess at usage. More
advanced meters will show spot and day-ahead rates so that the customer can plan
activities and avoid peak rates. However, peak hours often occur in the afternoon when
residential customers are at work and unavailable to manage appliances. Even corporate
customers may not have staff assigned full-time to watch and respond to rate changes.
The most advanced designs communicate with on-site equipment to reduce or cease
operations in response to customer-programmed price signals. In all cases,
responsiveness depends on an educated customer base that understands price
fluctuations and is willing to spend the time and attention to respond to them.
Real-time pricing faces a number of barriers to implementation.
*Advanced Metering Infrastructure deployment is problematic from a technical and
economic level. Despite multiple international demonstration sites, there is no
agreement on the desired capabilities of a smart meter. The costs of the meters will be
great and a debate exists over whether those costs should be included in rates,
amortized over time, or expensed in the year of deployment (FERC 2006).
* Legislation exists in California, New York, and the United Kingdom, preventing a
"dynamic by default" policy. Default settings have strong influence over consumer
behavior; research shows that fewer than 20% of consumers would switch to dynamic
pricing if given the option but that only 20% would switch away if defaulted in.
- Faruqui and Sergici (2009) suggest that these laws only protect consumers from
dynamic generation charges and that retailers may legally charge realtime prices for
transmission and distribution. This seems too clever and narrow a reading, one likely
to be plugged by lawmakers just as fast as it can be attempted.
- Even if customers are placed on dynamic rates, state regulators may place caps on
maximum tariffs and limit the ability of the market to respond. New York and
Delaware already have such restrictions and others are likely to follow as dynamic
pricing spreads.
Real-time pricing has the potential to change the electrical industry and the operations of
CSPs, but technical and legal factors will continue to slow adoption. Ratepayers
(especially residential customers) are unfamiliar with thinking about electricity as having
a variable price. Achieving desired levels of elasticity might require smart appliances or
other technology to automate consumer preferences. Half of all Danish electricity
consumption uses interval meters with the option of purchasing power at realtime rates.
However, few customers choose this option (Andersen, et al. 2006). Given longer time
horizons required for broad implementation of dynamic pricing, this investigation will
not model elastic demand.
2.2 Rolling Stochastic Unit Commitment
Stochastic rolling commitment represents an evolution of traditional unit commitment
techniques. It increases the frequency of decision making in order to modify decisions as
information quality improves. It also evaluates a range of possibilities and chooses the
best generation mix that optimizes across all eventualities, rather than optimizing the
most likely scenario or even the expected value of all scenarios. This technique is suited
to environments with uncertainty, such as systems with high intermittent generation
capacity.
Traditional unit commitment strategies deploy generators according to their marginal
cost and constraints related to ramping rates as well as minimum/maximum operation
levels. There is little uncertainty in these models. Small variations in demand are
handled through up/down regulation. Large loss of supply through the sudden
unavailability of transmission or generation capacity is handled through N-1
contingency planning. These decisions are made once per day with some intra-day fine-
tuning. The same process can be conducted at a vertically integrated utility in a
liberalized market; with complex bids the main difference between the two is the source
of the variables used for the optimization. Vertically integrated utilities obtain the
parameters through audits and analysis, while in a market the parameters are decided by
the generators in a bid submission. This system has proven effective for low-uncertainty
environments with good demand forecasting and predictable thermal generation.
The Ris0 DTU and University of Stuttgart developed a rolling stochastic unit
commitment model called "Wind power Integration in Liberalized electricity MARkets"
(WILMAR) (Barth, et al. 2006). This model includes the entire Nordic combined heat
and power system, but is extensible to represent other grids. It consists of two modules:
e The Scenario Tree Tool generates forecasts of statistical events such as wind, sun,
load, generation/transmission contingencies, forced outages, and hydro filling. It also
calculates reserve needs based upon these variables. These are based upon Monte
Carlo simulations from historical data. Wind data also uses spatial correlation
between towers. (Sbder 2004). This is based on an Auto Regressive Moving Average
time series model and assumes that forecast error is Gaussian (Lange and Focken
2006). Note that demand and wind predictions are assumed to be independent, but
replacement reserve depends upon the 9 0 h percentile error of both. The Scenario Tree
Tool generates 1000 paths at each decision period, then compresses them to six
weighted representations of the most likely and similar outcomes for efficiency's sake.
e The Scheduling Model uses GAMS to optimize the system for lowest cost according
to the scenarios and a description of the system's transmission/generator
characteristics. These parameters include fuel costs, operation & maintenance costs,
startup costs, maximum/minimum power, ramping rate, efficiency curves (piecewise
linear), lead-times. The model is solved each hour. Every decision period solves for
the generation mix that will produce the best outcome without knowing which
probabilistic scenario will be used in the future. In addition to scheduling generator
output, the model also respects the need for up/down regulation, contingency
reserves, and replacement reserves.
Rolling unit commitment involves frequent changes to the daily unit commitment plan.
Forecasts of wind, cloud cover, and demand improve throughout the day so the
decisions can be updated to reflect greater certainty. As long as a unit has not taken a
binding start-up or shutdown action at the time of re-evaluation, it can be adjusted
during the rolling interval. Because some units have slow startup ramps or long lead
times, it is necessary to make decisions well ahead of when these units will actually be
needed. The frequency of the decision cycle is variable in the tool, but most studies use a
3-hour interval for 8 decisions per day. Each decision cycle receives a tree in two stages
(12 and 36 hours) with six terminal branches. Actions taken in the immediate decision
cycle are treated deterministically based upon actual values, then optimized across all
future scenarios. Forecast hours in the immediate 3-hour period are handled by
replacement reserves.
For example, a timeline of the rolling decision process could resemble the following:
Day Time Name Action
1 12:00 Loop 1 Optimize across 6 scenarios covering the next 36 hours,
until 23:59 on day 2. Commit to day-ahead schedule.
15:00 Loop 2 Optimize across 6 improved scenarios covering the next
33 hours, until 23:59 on day 2. Adjust schedule from
Loop 1 where no hard startup/shutdown states exist.
18:00 Loop 3 Optimize across 6 improved scenarios covering the next
30 hours, until 23:59 on day 2. Adjust schedule from
Loop 2 where possible.
1-2 21:00- Loops 4-8 Continue to optimize scenarios ending on Day 2 23:59.
09:00 Adjust where possible.
2 12:00 Loop 9 Optimize 6 scenarios covering the next 36 hours, until
23:59 on day 3. Commit to day-ahead schedule
2-3 15:00- Loops 10-16 Optimize until 23:59 on day 4, adjust where possible.
09:00
3 12:00 Loop 17 Optimize until 23:59 on day 5, commit day-ahead.
Table 2-1: Rolling Unit Commitment Example
2.2.1 WILMAR Results
Ela et al. (2011) modeled the entire United States eastern interconnect in WILMAR.
The results were compared to the traditionally-dispatched Eastern Wind Integration and
Transmission Study (Enernex 2010). The authors found that rolling unit commitment
could save 2.4% cost and stochastic unit commitment could save 0.95%. This represents
a potential $1,502M and $598M benefit, respectively. Tuohy et al. (2009) similarly
quantify a 0.9% improvement in costs due to stochastic unit commitment in Ireland.
Note that system cost savings could be even greater than the amounts quoted in these
studies. The cost savings in the above studies occur at the hours-to-weeks unit
commitment time scale. By running the grid more efficiently, it is possible that longer-
term savings may enable deferral of capacity expansion in generation or transmission.
Morales Gonzales (2010) applied WILMAR to Spain. Due to the Iberian peninsula's
weak ties to the rest of the European grid, it is almost an island system. The paper
concludes that a stochastically-based short-term trading system for wind producers
achieves a great decrease in profit variability for a relatively small decrease in profit.
2.2.2 WILMAR and Demand Response
Keane et al. (2011) used WILMAR to model demand response in Ireland. The team
investigated demand response through three different mechanisms. Dynamic pricing
relies upon demand elasticity to curtail in response to price signals. Load shifting
considers demand response to be a form of "storage" by increasing consumption before
and after an event while reducing consumption during an event (40 E/MWh). Load
clipping reduces consumption during the event (80 E/MWh). The test case most relevant
to this investigation is "Case 1", which includes load shifting and clipping units but no
price response. The simulation dispatched demand response mostly as reserve due to its
flexibility. This case reduced the number of hours in which spinning and replacement
reserve requirements were not met by 50%. Demand response maintained wind
production, slightly increased coal contribution, and cut into base load gas.
The case was run in both stochastic and deterministic mode. Stochastic optimization
lead to increased energy production from mid merit gas plants for both demand response
scenarios. This is a attributed to uncertainty in wind output. The presence of demand
response lead to dramatically lower capacity factors at peaking units, though the
stochastic optimization still used them to counter variable wind conditions.
3 Method
This investigation customized the WILMAR rolling stochastic unit commitment model
by adding demand response. It searched a parameter space based upon the quantity and
price of available demand response resources. All cases studied an isolated version of the
Danish heat/electricity system with enhanced wind capability.
3.1 Modeling Assumptions
The simulation models the Danish heat and electrical system over 8 weeks from 4
seasons. The primary inputs to the model are demand (heat and electricity), wind
(forecast and actual), and the technical characteristics of the generation pool.
All simulation runs use the same assumptions regarding the generator mix in the Danish
electrical system. Most thermal generation assets are combined heat and power (CHP)
units, able to adjust their generation mix to provide heating or electricity. A few are heat-
only units. District heat supplies 61% of Danish homes, and 80% of the heat comes from
CHP plants (Danish Energy Agency 2010). Note that even without any wind
generation, the system is capable of handling peak demand.
Nameplate Min Load Min
Generator Capacity' Lead Time Factor Operation
Fuel Count (total, MW) (mean, hr) (mean) (mean, hr)
Natural gas 14 2611 1 0.5 1
Coal 12 4358 4 0.4 4
Fuel oil 19 903 1 0.2 1
Light oil 1 196 1 0.2 1
Muni waste 5 300 12 0.75 4
Straw 7 297 4 0.4 3.57
Wood 2 317 4 0.4 4
Wind 2 4100 -- -- --
Total 62 13082
Table 3-1: Selected Technical Capabilities of Generators
The energy mix and load factors of each generator are an output of the simulation. Each
are different depending upon the amount of demand response available. See Table 2-1
for typical load factors by fuel type.
All simulations used 1200MW of nameplate wind capacity in the east and 2900MW of
nameplate wind capacity in the west for a total of 4100MW. In 2009, wind power
accounted for 18.3% of electricity supply (Danish Energy Agency 2010). This is
1 Electricity only. Heat is not reflected in this table.
represented by 2,821 MW nameplate capacity of onshore turbines and 661 offshore for a
total of 3482MW. The increase in simulated capacity is intended to represent a 20%
wind scenario.
The study simulates 8 weeks of system operation with their attendant wind and demand
levels. These 8 weeks are a concatenation of 2 winter, 2 spring, 2 summer, and 2 autumn
weeks. The following chart shows demand during the peak winter months. See Figure
A, Figure A-, and Figure A- for spring, summer, and autumn behavior. Also displayed is
net demand, which represents demand minus available wind.
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Figure 3-1: Electrical demand and wind, Winter
Demand peaks in the afternoon and evening. Wind is relatively constant, though there is
a mid-day maximum. The following chart shows average energy intensity across the
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Figure 3-2: Average electrical demand and wind supply by hour, all seasons
Sorting each hour's energy use (absolute and net) produces a load-duration curve. The
shape shows how much time the system spends at peak and minimum demand.
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Figure 3-3: Load-duration curve, 8 selected weeks of 52
The load-duration curve for the 8 week study period is relatively flat. The system is
above 90% of peak load 4.5% of the time. California, for example, is above 90% of peak
load for only 57 hours per year - 0.65%(California ISO 2007). After subtracting wind
generation, the net load-duration curve shows more peak behavior requiring units to be
active for short amounts of time. Noteworthy is that there are some periods of very low
net load (1100MW) below the combined minimum operation level of all coal generators
(1743MW = 4358*0.4, from Table 3-1). This implies that either some coal must be shut
down when the wind is blowing at night or the wind must be curtailed. Note also that
the net load-duration curve will not be identical for all subsequent cases. Realized wind
power will vary each time the simulation is run.
All simulations used the same heat demand. Heat demand is highest in Winter and
nearly nonexistent in Summer. Heat is relevant to the optimization because of the
prevalence of CHP units.
The simulation breaks demand and supply into regions and monitors electrical flows
between them. Transmission capacity is limited between regions, though it is rare for
transmission to be the constraining factor in the simulations. The transmission system
does incur losses when used. All data is presented here in aggregate for both regions.
To prepare for a follow-up study of island electric grids, all imports and exports of
energy were ignored. This alters the nature of the Danish electrical system, which
typically imports power from Norway or Germany when wind drops and exports power
at night.
3.2 WILMAR Operations
All simulations used a rolling commitment window of 3 hours. (Tuohy, et al. 2009)
studied the influence of window frequency on the Irish electrical system with high wind
penetration. As the decision window lengthens from 3 to 6 hours, replacement reserve
requirements and associated costs increase. As the decision window shortens from 3
hours to 1, costs increase for up- and down-regulation. The investigation concluded that
a stochastic optimization delivers lowest-cost results with a 3-hour window.
Most simulations were run in "stochastic" mode. Stochastic simulations optimize
scheduling across a portfolio of 12 scenarios for each 36-hour decision window. The
resulting decisions are therefore almost guaranteed not to be optimal for the resulting
realized conditions. For comparison's sake, a few simulations were run in
"deterministic" mode. Deterministic simulations assume perfect forecasting and
therefore represents an ideal for system operation.
Wind curtailment was allowed in all simulations. WILMAR has an option that forces
wind generators to bid their expected power output into the day-ahead market. This
option is used if maximum wind production is an explicit target of system operation.
The simulations allowed wind generators to bid less than their maximum.
There is no dynamic pricing or elastic demand. Consistent with Andersen et al. (2006),
few customers in Denmark use dynamic pricing plans. Note that WILMAR has the
capacity to simulate with dynamic pricing, so this could be a variable in a follow-up
study.
3.3 Modeling Demand Response
This study models demand response as a load shifting generation resource. For the
purpose of simulation, the actual demand curve remains unaltered. The net demand
curve after demand resource calls and rebound effects represents the realized
consumption curve. This allows for a comparison of exogenous demand with demand
response contributions.
Demand response is a flexible resource. It has zero startup/shutdown cost and zero
minimum operation duration. It can run 100% efficiently at any load factor. If the
simulation operated on a timescale of less than 1 hour, demand response would have
some ramping constraint as resources came online. With the long timescale, demand
response is considered to have an unconstrained ramp rate.
Natural Gas
Attribute Units Fast-DR Slow-DR Turbine2
Power capacity MW 205-4100 205-4100 391
Minimum load MW 0 0 196
Lead time hours 0 3 1
Shutdown time hours 0 0 1
Min operation hours 0 0 1
Max operation hours 23 2 N/A
Spinning reserve? - Yes No Yes
Fuel cost E/MWh 28.67-71.67 22.93-57.34 27.00
O&M Cost E/MWh 1.67
Startup Cost I /MWh 0 0 5
Table 3-2: Technical capabilities of demand response
The main technical constraint of demand response is its lead-time. The pool is divided
equally into "fast-DR" and "slow-DR" to reflect differences in lead-time. Slow-DR has a
3 hour lead-time. Real world fast-DR has a 10-minute lead-time and is modeled here as
0 hours. Fast-DR is permitted to operate as spinning reserve, while slow-DR is not.
In this simulation, there is no demand response load clipping. Consistent with
Borenstein (2005), the rebound effect demands more energy than was originally
deferred. The "storage" is assumed to "charge" with an efficiency of 95%. See
"Appendix E: Demand Response Modeled as Load Clipping" for a comparison of load
shifting and load clipping in the WILMAR model.
3.4 Parameter: Demand Response Quantity
2 Unit identifier is "DK W Trefor ST-E9-NGn"
3 Each MW of capacity can operate for a maximum of 2 hours.
The study varies levels of demand response quantity as an input to each simulation.
Demand response quantity can be thought of the number of customers who are
committed to reduce load when asked to do so. The baseline simulation has zero
demand response capability. All other cases vary the amount of available demand
response resources to investigate the effect upon grid operations and customers.
Demand response power is presented here as a normalized ratio relative to the
nameplate capacity of all wind generation. The quantities explored range from 10% of
all wind power (410MW) 200% of all wind power (8200MW). As peak demand is less
than 7000MW, the maximum DR case is a thought experiment representing full
participation and fully-curtailable load. True response capability will be a function of
time and date. Real-world summertime curtailment would be lower due to the lack of
electric heating. Real-world nighttime curtailment would be lower since many energy-
drawing operations are not happening. (Lassen and Jensen 2005) surveyed Danish
ratepayers and determined that residential weekend curtailment is 2-3x geater than
weekday load reduction. These details are ignored for the purpose of the study.
Demand response also has an energy component relating to the duration of curtailment.
All resources are assumed to have a maximum duration of 2 hours, giving an energy
capacity (MWh) double the maximum power capacity.
Each demand response pool is divided equally into slow-DR and fast-DR resources.
The smaller demand response quantities are achievable. A Danish demonstration project
with electric heating (Kofod and Trogeby 2004) showed that it was possible to obtain
demand response of up to 5 kW per involved household. There are 125,000 households
with electric heating in Denmark, implying 625MW of full-participation wintertime
capacity from residential use alone. A small demonstration project (Nordel 2004) signed
up 31MW of industrial users with generators in a single factory park. Multiplying this by
20 similarly-sized parks results in 620MW of industrial demand response. This 1GW of
demand resources alone represents the 25% of wind case. The achievability of the higher
cases may require further study and new technologies.
3.5 Parameter: Demand Response Price
The study investigates 3 levels of demand response price: low, medium, and high. This
price is not necessarily related to the cost of operating the demand response resource or
the incentive payments granted to subscribers. The price is an input to the optimization
function. It represents the bid price of a unit of demand energy (E/MWh). The
theoretical CSP will be paid the (day-ahead or intra-day) market price of the actual
energy curtailed at the time it is delivered.
Walawaker et al. (2008) found that the optimal range for demand response payments in
the PJM area was $67-77 $/MWh. This value is system-dependent. Demand response
price here is represented as a normalized quantity relative to the marginal cost of the
most expensive peaking unit on the system.
The optimization considers only the marginal price of activating demand response.
There is also an annual fixed cost to maintaining a demand response pool. These
capacity payments are usually greater than the actual energy payments. Since capacity
payments do not influence actual unit commitment decisions, they can be ignored by the
optimization. Selecting the optimal quantity of DR will depend on the fixed costs. The
relationship between optimal quantity and capacity costs will be discussed in the
conclusion.
Demand response is not a uniform resource. Demand that responds very quickly (<10
minutes) to system interruptions is priced at a premium to responses with more lead
time. Longer durations of response also command higher prices; a customer may not
mind a 30-minute interruption but a 6-hour loss can be invasive. As mentioned in
section 3.4 Parameter: Demand Response Quantity, duration is assumed to be the same
for all generators. The pool is divided equally into "fast-DR" and "slow-DR" to reflect
differences in lead-time. Slow-DR has a 3 hour lead-time and uses the reported price of
demand response. Real world fast-DR has a 10-minute lead-time and is modeled here as
0 hours. Fast-DR commands a 20% premium on the price of slow-DR.
Note that the price of demand response is not fully independent of quantity in the real
world. There is a distribution of ratepayer willingness to curtail in response to varying
demand levels. A small desired quantity of demand response may be achievable at
relatively low prices by targeting ratepayers with flexible energy needs. The last
customer to participate may only be willing to do so in exchange for large incentive
payments. (Lassen and Jensen 2005) show that the bottom 8% of ratepayers require
incentive payments that are 60% lower than the mean incentive for a given curtailment
profile. The marginal cost of demand response will always increase the more is needed.
The benefits of demand reduction do not require that all customers participate. By
lowering prices for everyone, curtailers cause system benefits greater than their own
incentive payments (if on a fixed-rate plan) or savings from deferred cost (if on dynamic
pricing). This raises the possibility of a free rider problem; a customer on a flat rate plan
may enjoy lower fixed generation charges due to reduced system costs while not paying
premiums for peak use. The converse argument is that some participants consider
incentive payments an inefficient subsidy. Richard Tempchin of the Edison Electric
Institute declared (FERC 2006) that
[A]ny payment to a customer for demand reduction should never exceed
the wholesale price minus the retail price that the customers would have
otherwise paid to own the power. Any payment above this level would be
a subsidy, that is, a nonmarket payment that has to be recovered through
a tax or charge on all customers.
In a market where so many customers are shielded from the true cost of their
consumption, cross-subsidies are already inherent in the system and may need to be
corrected with other targeted payments. There is no one correct model for incentives
and pricing for demand response.
4 Results
The experiment simulated the Danish heat and power system over 8 weeks representing
4 seasons. The output of the experiments was a characterization of system operation
with varying quantity and price of demand response as compared to the baseline
scenario of no demand response. With these results, the investigation aimed to describe
the tradeoffs between demand response's impact on ratepayers and its ability to improve
electrical system operations.
4.1 Baseline: Stochastic Optimization with No Demand Response
The stochastic optimization with no demand response represents the control group. All
demand response experiments will compare to this result. This section details the
behavior of the stochastic optimization.
The output of the simulation is a time series representing each hour. Some data such as
demand, electricity price, heat price, or transmission quantity are given on a per-region
basis. Each generator unit has an electricity output, heat output, fuel usage. The
following chart aggregates electricity generation by fuel type and shows two weeks of
winter output. Generation profiles for the Spring, Summer, and Autumn weeks are
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Figure 4-1: Winter generation profile, stochastic baseline
Note the prevalence of coal power (darkest grey). Wind is steady and strong at the
beginning of the time period but there are two days at the end with almost no wind at






remain constant throughout due to long lead times and extended minimum operation
times.
4.1.1 Evaluation Metrics
The performance of the system was evaluated based upon operating cost, emissions
levels, generation mix, and ratepayer impact of demand response.
Criterion Unit Value (No DR)
Cost E/MWh 27.97
CO 2 emissions kg/MWh 166.2
SO2 emissions kg/MWh 1.09
Wind energy fraction .28
Coal energy fraction .55
Natural gas energy fraction .05
Demand response impact MWh/day N/A
Table 4-1: System operation evaluation criteria, no demand response
Cost: System cost represents the objective function of the optimization. It represents
fuel cost, operation & maintenance cost, startup/shutdown cost, transmission losses,
taxes, and subsidies. Systems have costs on longer timescales such as forward
capacity markets and transmission planning; these are not represented in the
optimization. Cost varies over time, so the value presented here is an average. Cost is
measured in E/MWh of demand. Note that the normalizing energy term (/MWh)
represents exogenous energy demanded rather than energy produced. Energy lost to
transmission or storage cycling is waste and should not be considered when
normalizing.
- CO 2 & SO2 : This represents the average amount of emissions produced by the system
over time. This is influenced primarily by the aggregate generation mix. However,
thermal plants will consume more fuel per unit of output electricity when starting up
or when operating close to their minimum operating load. The system can produce
fewer emissions for the same power level by running fewer plants closer to their
optimal efficiency point rather than several plants at the minimum. Each fuel has a
level of CO 2 and SO2 emitted per GJ burned, so calculating emissions is a matter of
multiplying fuel consumed at each power plant by the constants. Emissions are
measured in kg/MWh of demand.
- Wind energy: This is the energy contribution of wind over the study period. The
actual amount of wind available at any given hour is determined by nature, but the
amount of wind harvested by a wind farm will depend upon unit commitment
decisions. If all thermal units are running near their minimum levels, a wind farm
may be directed to feather blades and curtail output. The primary objective of this
paper is to study the ability of demand response to encourage improved wind
harvesting through system optimization. Wind energy is measured in MWh, though
it is presented here as a fraction of overall grid energy generation.
*Natural Gas energy: This is the total contribution of natural gas to the electricity
mix. Natural gas is a highly responsive resource, with fast ramping rates and short
advance notification requirements. It is a natural complement to variable wind power.
- Coal energy: This is the total fraction of all electricity that is produced by coal
plants. Coal is an inexpensive fuel, but coal generators are slow to start up and cannot
react to fast changes in wind availability.
Demand response impact: This number represents the average amount of energy
requested of demand resources per day. Not all participating ratepayers will be called
for every demand event, so this does not reflect the impact of demand response upon
every participating individual. It is a sum value for impact across the entire system.
The value for the baseline case is of course zero.
Other metrics were calculated but will not be discussed further:
* Fuel oil energy: Fuel oil is used in Denmark primarily to provide heat, not electricity.
It can provide some electricity as a peaking resource. The plants ramp quickly and
have short lead times. Fuel oil plants have a high marginal cost like natural gas
plants. The effects upon fuel oil generators are similar to those of natural gas
generators.
* Straw/Wood/Municipal Waste energy: The system also contains straw, wood, and
municipal waste generators. These make up a small portion of the overall energy mix.
These generation units are relatively inflexible and will be used 1-2% more with
demand response availability.
*Reliability: Reliability is measured as the number of hours that the system fails to
meet load or spinning reserve requirements. The baseline case with no demand
response has zero hours with reliability issues. There are still zero hours of inadequate
supply or reserve after adding demand response.
4.1.2 Wind Harvesting
Uncertainty in the simulations comes mainly from wind power availability. The
simulation also contains a chance of generation unit failure. Other probabilistic events
such as run-of-river hydro power, hydro reservoir filling, and solar power collection are
not used in this simulation. Demand forecasting is assumed to be perfect. Uncertainty
can lead to significant "wind shedding", the process of feathering blades and collecting
less than 100% of available wind energy. Wind shedding will be an important factor in
the upcoming discussion of demand response and its effects on grid operation.
This figure characterizes the quality of wind forecasting and the ability of the system to
harvest available wind:
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Figure 4-2: Wind forecasting and wind curtailment, stochastic optimization
The first plot shows the forecast of wind strength 24 hours ahead as compared to the
actual realized wind strength. Wind strength is shown in units of energy rather than
velocity to account for nonlinearities in the turbine's power curve. The actual wind is
usually within a factor of 2 of the 24-hour forecast. However, there are notable
deviations such as the cluster of time points on the left of the chart indicating a low
forecast and much stronger realized value.
The second plot shows the ability of the wind generators to harvest the available wind
energy. The X-axis shows the actual available wind energy and the Y-axis shows the
energy produced. The strong diagonal line shows that wind producers usually achieve
full wind production. However, there are times when wind operators must feather their
blades and collect less than the entire available wind energy. Feathering is not ideal, but
is a valid unit commitment strategy. During the night when wind is high and demand is
low, it may be preferable to run a wind generator at less than its peak power output in
order to keep a baseload generator above its minimum operating level. Increases in
forecast error will increase shedding; an earlier unit commitment decision may not be
able to harvest energy from a sudden midday gust of wind if there is no down-regulation
capacity on the grid. In this case, wind operators were forced by system constraints to
shed 5.54% of available wind energy.
The final plot shows the relationship between actual wind energy and the system
demand. This shows the grid constraints that may lead to wind shedding. When the
ratio of available wind power to demand is high (red colors), thermal generators are
more likely to be at their minimum levels and require reduced wind production. This is
related to the discussion of the load-duration curve from Figure 3-3. This chart uses a
rainbow scheme to display the ratio between the two factors in order to prepare the
reader for an identical color affordance in chart Figure 4-3.
Factoring each of the three above relationships as a ratio enables all data sets to be
plotted on one chart. Each dot is one hour of simulation.
" The X-axis shows the wind forecast as a ratio of actual wind to the day-ahead
forecast. Because the error is two-sided, the ratio is displayed logarithmically. 1.0
represents perfect wind forecasting.
" The Y-axis shows the wind feathering behavior as a ratio of generated wind to the
actual wind available at realtime. 1.0 represents perfect wind harvesting.
* Color shows the maximum wind component that could be realized during that hour
in relationship to the total demand. 1.0 would represent wind supplying 100% of
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Figure 4-3: Consolidated view of wind forecasting and curtailment
When actual wind is much weaker than the forecast wind (left side of the graph),
generators tend to harvest 100% of the available energy. The system is expecting more
energy from the generators, so there is no need for feathering.
The center of the graph shows the typical case in which actual wind is within a factor of
two of the forecast. Though the grid can generally work around these errors and allow
wind to produce its theoretical maximum, there are some cases in which wind operators
must make deep cuts to operations. Note the preponderance of blue marks in the lower
region; this shows that the deepest cuts happen when wind generation is a relatively
small amount of overall demand. By bringing a new thermal unit online, the wind is
curtailed or even disabled to keep the thermal unit above its operating minimum.
The right region of the graph represents actual wind much stronger than the forecast. In
most cases, wind operators can increase their production and thermal operators can
curtail levels. Notice the clusters of orange and red points in the 80-95% harvesting
range; when wind represents a very high level of system power there may not be any
room for the thermal generators to reduce capacity. However, there is so much wind that
shedding 200MW of power is still a relatively small percentage of the overall production.
4.1.3 Thermal Unit Performance
Thermal generation units are those that bum fuel to produce electricity and (often) heat.
With no hydro or solar capacity on the Danish grid, all non-wind generators are thermal
units. Most thermal units use fossil fuels like coal or oil, but some use renewable fuels
like wood. Thermal units have costs associated with starting up, as well as an amount of
lead time before they reach operational capacity. The optimization must work around
the technical constraints on thermal units to balance demand when wind supply varies.
The "capacity factor" of a unit shows how frequently and at what output level that unit is
used. The nameplate power rating of a generator limits its maximum energy production
during the study period. In reality, few units are run at their maximum level all the time.
Wind generation is limited by available resources and thermal units are dispatched
according to system need. The fraction of realized energy produced divided by potential
energy is the capacity factor. The following table shows capacity factors for each
generator, aggregated by fuel type. The capacity factor for the least-used and most-used
generator is also shown. Note that the table shows only electrical capacity factor, not
heating capacity factor. Note also that generator counts and nameplate power numbers
may be different than Table 3-2, as this table only includes units that generate nonzero
levels of electrical energy during the study period.
Electrical Electrical Capacity Capacity Capacity
Generator Power Energy Factor Factor Factor
Fuel Count (MW) (GWh) (mean) (min) (max)
Natural gas 9 2567 306 0.09 <0.01 0.26
Coal 12 4358 3163 0.54 0.12 0.75
Fuel oil 5 903 42 0.04 <0.01 0.19
Muni waste 5 300 333 0.83 0.63 0.98
Straw 7 297 93 0.23 0.01 0.70
Wood 2 317 206 0.48 0.02 0.57
Wind 2 4100 1671 0.30 0.28 0.37
Table 4-2: Electrical load factors of generators, no demand response
Municipal waste and coal plants spend more time running close to maximum than other
fuel types. These plants have long lead times and slow ramp rates, so the optimization
prefers not to vary their output over the course of the simulation. Natural gas and fuel oil
units react quickly and are frequently cycled. These units are offline almost the entire
time with only a few hours of operation, hence the low capacity factor and existence of
units with load factors less than 1%. Wind achieves a capacity factor of 30%, which is in
the reported range of 25.7-46.7% for Danish wind farms (Smith 2011).
The load profile of a unit shows how much time it spends at a given percentage of its
maximum output. The following chart is a histogram showing number of hours on the
Y-axis and levels of output on the X-axis. Black bars represent electricity output and
white bars are heat output. The dashed line shows the minimum stable electrical output
of the plant. The plant may spend some time below this level while starting up or
shutting down. The far left bar (zero load factor) represents time that the unit spends















Figure 4-4: Load profile, coal unit, no demand response
This generator runs consistently close to its 80% of its maximum electrical capacity and
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The following chart displays the load profile for selected coal generators. Most are
combined heat and power units, though one (E Rural ST-C8-COs) is electricity-only.
W Urban ST-E9-Cosn W Aarhus ST-E8-Cos E Rural ST-E8-ORs E Urban ST-E9-Cosn
0.5
W Aalborg ST-E9-Cosn W Odense ST-E9-Cosn W Aalborg ST-E7-CO E Rural ST-C8-COs
1 372MW 39W28M 270MW0.5
E Rural ST-E7-CO E Urban ST-B1-COsn W Rural ST-Ba8-CO
1 145M 7WM Electricity[I] Heat0.5 E~
- Min load
0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1
Figure 4-5: Load profile, multiple coal units, no demand response
The optimization favors running multiple units near their operational minima. All units
are shut down at some time or another; this does not look like traditional baseload
power. (The generator from Figure 4-4 is in the upper right here.)













Figure 4-6: Load profile, multiple natural gas units, no demand response
The optimization barely dispatches natural gas units at all. This accounts for the typical
9% capacity factor seen in Table 4-2. Most of the generators spend their time shut off,
then ramp up for a short burst at minimum capacity, then ramp back down. This is not
the desired mode of operation for any generating unit, as it runs the plant in its
inefficient range and wastes fuel on startup/shutdown.
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4.2 Single Result with Demand Response
The primary purpose of this investigation was to explore the impact of demand response
price and quantity upon system operation. This section's results show the effect of a
single combination of these two demand response parameters upon system cost,
emissions, and operational decisions.
The optimization uses demand response to fill gaps when thermal units are not
available. The following figure shows demand response being dispatched on a windy
summer day. Similar to Figure 4-1, the colored bands show the electricity produced by
generators in different fuel classes. This figure adds red bands to show times when
demand response is active. Note that total energy consumed can now exceed the
exogenous demand levels, indicated by a magenta line for the "rebound effect." This
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Figure 4-7: Generation mix, with demand response (Q=0.5, P=1.2)
In the simulation, strong winds overnight lead to a near-zero net demand. Building
owners pre-cooled their facilities and shifted consumption into the night to prepare for a
demand curtailment the next day. Demand response stepped in during the rapidly rising
demand and at peak on the next morning. The slow-moving municipal waste plant did
not have to shut down overnight.
Demand response addresses both wind uncertainty and demand peaking. Even with
zero wind contribution, the system will still call upon demand resources to optimize
operational cost. The following figure compares a full wind (4100 MW) case and a zero-
wind case. Both use 2050 MW (quantity = 0.50) of load shifting demand response with a
price ratio of 1.2 as compared to a natural gas generator.
The differences between the two operational philosophies are best illustrated by
inspecting the use of demand resources by time of day. The left chart compares the with-
wind demand response energy calls paired hourly with their corresponding hours with
no demand response. The right chart shows the average demand response call by hour
for both wind cases. Color on both charts indicates time of day, with red at noon and
blue at midnight. Note that this graphic does not include the "rebound effect"; all values
represent only demand that is lower than exogenous system normal.
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Figure 4-8: Demand response calls by time of day, wind and no wind
When the system has no wind, demand response is only used to manage consumption
during the mid-day and evening peaks. With unpredictable wind, demand response may
be dispatched at any time of day. The mean energy called per day is 3x as large with
wind than without. Event length is 2x larger with wind than without. Roughly 2/3 of the
value of demand response is in service of handling wind uncertainty.
Demand response acts as a cushion to prevent high system costs. The baseline no-DR
scenario is not capacity constrained, even in the winter peaking weeks. It therefore
contains no extremely large cost spikes. The comparison of hourly prices between the
two cases (left) shows no large deviations. Viewing average system cost by hour (right)
shows that demand response depresses cost by 1-2 E/MWh at all times of the day.
Average system cost without demand response is E27.97/MWh. With demand response,
system cost drops to E26.92/MWh.
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Figure 4-9: System cost, with and without demand response
Note that in all stochastic runs, a different actual wind pattern will appear. Values that
are summed over the entire study period are roughly comparable since differences will
even out in the long run. Any differences at the hourly level will depend upon wind
behavior and system response to that wind. At the fine time scale presented here,
individual differences cannot be distinguished between wind and demand response.
/
Demand response can react faster to changing conditions faster than a natural gas or fuel
oil unit. This enables the optimization to schedule more wind in times when a less-
responsive system would conservatively plan to feather wind power. Similar to Figure
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Figure 4-10: Wind harvesting with demand response
Curtailment levels are only 1.65% with demand response as compared to 5.54% without.
There are zero hours in which wind had to be completely curtailed. The case of higher-
than-expected wind with low net demand (red dots on the upper right of the graph) has
more hours with 100% wind harvesting.
Demand response causes the optimization to run thermal plants differently. As in Figure
4-4, this chart shows the load profile for Denmark's largest coal plant. Black bars show
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Figure 4-11: Load profile, coal unit, with demand response
With demand response, this coal unit runs at its minimum generation much less. While
it was never shut off without demand response, demand response causes the plant to be
shut down about 15% of the time. Total time spent at 90% and 100% load is greater.
No DR electricity
No DR heaI
DR 0=0.5 P=1 ..2 eleciricity
DR 0=0-5 P=1. 2 heat
Min load
This effect is consistent across units. This plot shows the load profile for the coal and
natural gas generator classes. Heat has been removed for readability's sake.
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Figure 4-12: Load profiles, coal class, with demand response
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Demand response enables the electrical system to run with a more efficient use of
resources. Adding demand resources improves cost, lowers emissions, enables more
wind, and reduces use of fossil fuels.
Value Value A (%)
Criterion Unit (no DR) (DR)
Cost E/MWh 27.97 26.93 -3.72
CO 2 emissions kg/MWh 166.2 160.1 -3.81
SO2 emissions kg/MWh 1.09 1.05 -3.81
Wind energy fraction .280 .313 +11.8
Coal energy fraction .550 .533 -5.5
Natural gas energy fraction .053 .039 -26.4
Demand response impact MWh/day N/A 265 N/A
Table 4-3: System operation evaluation criteria, with demand response
4.3 Demand Response Parametric Search - Price & Quantity
This investigation has now explored the baseline behavior with no demand response and
looked in-depth at the system with one combination of demand response price and
quantity. This section will look at a family of demand response parameters and view the
system behavior.
The following several charts will display the results of the system evaluation criteria as a
function of the size/quantity input parameters. In most cases demand response increases
wind power harvesting and reduces thermal plant use, which lowers system cost and
emissions. The quantity of demand response generally has more system impact than the
price; it is generally valuable enough that the optimization uses as much of the resource
as possible.
This graph shows the search space used for all following simulation runs.
The Y-axis represents the bid price of demand response as a normalized fashion relative
to the most expensive peaking unit on the system. Price is expressed on the plot through
color, blue cheapest and red most expensive.
The quantity (MW) of DR is expressed on the X-axis as a normalized factor relative to
the nameplate capacity of the amount of wind on the system (MW). The smallest
amount of demand response power capacity (shown by a plus) is 5% the nameplate
power capacity of wind. For ease of tracking, all equal-quantity values are connected by
a thin line. Note that in all cases the energy capacity (MWh) of the demand response




















Figure 4-14: Demand response experimental space
This graph shows no results, only the relationships of the inputs. Not every possible
combination of parameters was simulated. Some parameter pairs were simulated
multiple times to test the repeatability of the results. The following figures show the
system's operational metrics within the framework of this study space.
oI
The objective function of the optimization is system operational cost (E/MWh). This is
normalized relative to the baseline case with no demand response. Cost varies over time,
so the value presented here is an average over the 8-week study period.
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Figure 4-15: System operation cost with demand response
Extremely small quantities of demand response have little impact upon system cost.
With little capacity available, the resource is not deployed as frequently or as deep as the
optimization would prefer. A 0.25 quantity rating shows a 3% cost savings for all price
levels. Further quantity levels asymptotically approach a improve performance of 3.5%.
Because the rebound effect requires more net energy to be generated than is curtailed,
increasing energy production demands match the decreasing marginal value of the next
unit of demand response energy. Quantity has much more effect on system cost than
does price.
Demand response enables cost savings through enabling more wind power (near-zero
marginal cost) and through more efficient deployment of thermal power generators.
These aspects will be explored in greater detail later.
Unlike other energy sources, deploying demand response has a direct effect upon
ratepayers' lives. The level of this impact will influence the ability of the system operator
to deploy demand response as a solution. In the following chart, the X-axis represents
the normalized price of demand response. The Y-axis represents the impact that demand
response has upon ratepayers. The metric represents the average energy dispatched per
day. (MWh/day) DR impact internalizes both quantity and price while reflecting the
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Figure 4-16: Demand response price and customer impact
When demand response is plentiful and cheap, it is called frequently. Case (P=0.80
Q=2.0) sees an average of 4.3 hours of demand response calls per day with some
extreme cases up to 16 hours. These are not necessarily large in terms of energy
demanded; even though the Q=2.0 cases have an unrealistically large 8200MW power
rating, the maximum hourly call is 500MW. Larger pools of demand response resources
create larger use not through power capacity but through energy capacity. Each
individual resource is limited in the duration that it may be called. By chaining multiple
customers' curtailments, a demand event can last much longer than any given customer's
ability to participate. The generous quantities available mean that the pool of curtailable
load is never close to being exhausted.
In contrast, small quantities of demand response are energy-limited. The (P=0.80
Q=0.10) case has 40 days with some sort of demand call as compared to 45 days at
Q=2.0. Each of these calls are shallower (max 200MW) and shorter (2.7 hours) in order
to avoid emptying the pool of demand resources. In this case, there are 5 occasions on
which demand response is unable to sustain operations at current rates.
Demand response impact will be displayed as the X-axis in most upcoming figures.
This information can now be used to trade off efficiency of system operation and
customer impact of demand response. This graph does not put either of the input
variables (demand response price of quantity) onto the X- or Y-axis. Use color, shape,
and the legend to map individual cases to the outcomes. The X-axis contains demand
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Figure 4-17: Demand response impact and system cost
As long as demand response quantity is at or above 50% of wind power, system costs
remain relatively constant for all possible levels of demand response impact. Lowering
the price of demand response serves to increase perceived customer impact (by up to an
order of magnitude) without improving costs. Until Q=0.5, the system is capacity-
constrained and is willing to use demand resources at any price. Beyond Q=0.5, the
optimization will use demand resources at all price points without improving system
costs significantly.
At the same price (P=2.0), perceived impact varies between 25-100 MWh/day, a small
variation on the scale of results shown here. However, system operation costs span the




From Figure 4-8, 2/3 of the function of demand response on the grid is in cushioning the
unpredictable effects of wind power. This figure shows the relationship between demand
response and wind penetration. The Y-axis here represents the amount of energy
contributed to the grid from wind power. The factor is normalized relative to the
contribution of wind in the no-DR baseline case. Demand response changes wind
scheduling by providing more emergency up- and down-regulation to the system. Wind
does not need to be curtailed as much in order to keep thermal generators running at
their operational minimum levels.
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Figure 4-18: Demand response and wind energy
Even with small amounts of demand response (Q=O.10), wind contributes 5% more to
the overall energy mix than with no demand response at all. Feasible quantities of
demand response (Q=0.25-1.0) show improvements in the 10% range. The infeasible
Q=2.0 case is able to increase wind penetration by over 15%. Price has a smaller but still
noticeable influence on wind generation.
All demand response parameters have <1% wind shedding during the 17:00-20:00 hours
when electrical consumption is high and wind is low. Demand response influences wind
shedding before and after this peak time, enabling a greater harvest of wind energy. At
12:00, (P=0.80 Q=0.5) averages 1.8% wind shedding while wind producers must shed
4.0% with no demand response. Most of the wind energy is added to the system during
off-peak hours due to increased demand from load shifting.
The simulations also enable an investigation of the system's emissions. In the following
figures, the X-axis uses the same demand response impact measure as above. The Y-axes
show the normalized CO 2 and SO2 emissions for the grid, relative to the baseline case
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Figure 4-20: Demand response and CO 2
Similar to the operating cost numbers, emissions decrease as the size of the demand
response pool increases from Q=0.0.5 to Q=0.50. Beyond Q=0.50, emissions remain
relatively flat. Decreasing demand response price has some influence on emissions, but
not as much as quantity.
Since emissions are proportionate to fuel burned and demand response does not












The fuel mix is the primary driver of emissions and cost. Thermal generator operations
(startup/shutdown, load factor) contribute as well. The contributions of each fuel type
therefore explain the variation in system performance. This chart shows coal plants'
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Figure 4-21: Demand response and coal energy fraction
Coal represents the largest source of energy on the Danish grid. Wind is the second
largest. As demand response enables wind power to increase (Figure 4-18), coal power
decreases.
When demand response capability is small (Q=0. 10), startup counts of coal plants can
actually increase by 1-2% (Figure D-1). Otherwise, demand response enables coal plants
to start up about 10% less often.
Demand curtailment substitutes for natural gas generation, which already makes up a
relatively small (less than 10% that of coal) amount of the system's energy contribution.
As a highly responsive resource with high marginal cost, natural gas and demand
response behave similarly when handling forecast uncertainty from wind. The
substitution effect is not perfect since demand response is duration-limited and does not
produce heat. This graph shows the quantity of demand response resources (X-axis)
against the total energy contribution of natural gas generators (Y-axis). The natural gas
energy contribution is normalized relative to the amount of natural gas generation in the
base case with no demand response.
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Figure 4-22: Demand response and natural gas energy contribution
In most cases, natural gas generation represents about 25% less energy contribution than
the base case. A regression (Figure C-2) of generation from flexible fuel sources (natural
gas & fuel oil) shows a coefficient of -0.84 (r2=0.58). Every 100 MWh of demand
response called reduces the amount of flexible fuel generation by 85MWh. The elasticity
of this substitution (and the quality of the fit) increases by ignoring the Q=2.0 data.
Demand response is definitely substituting for natural gas generation.
When Q>0. 10, startups of natural gas plants are reduced by 40% (Figure D-2). Reducing
startups causes less waste from startup costs and enables the plants to run in a more
efficient operating range.
The preceding investigation has defined system response in terms of abstract demand
response quantity and pricing. The work of selecting an ideal price and quantity depends
upon customers' tolerance for electrical interruption. Determining the social cost of
demand response and selecting an optimum parameter pair is beyond the scope of this
study. Other studies can show the shape of the social utility curve and point the way to
future directions. Lassen and Jensen (2005) surveyed Danish residential electricity
customers to determine their willingness to have appliance use interrupted. The survey
covered both event duration and frequency. It found that customers placed a high per-
hour price on any interruption at all, but that as frequency and duration increased
customers demand marginally less compensation. This result implies that the lowest-cost
solution per unit of energy curtailed is to have a smaller pool of demand response
customers and to call them regularly for longer individual events.
E/hr compensation4  Frequency (events/appliance-year)
2-3 12 30
Duration 0.25 18.27 6.04 2.55
(hr) 1 6.04 1.88 0.80
3 2.68 0.94 0.53
Table 4-4: Ratepayer compensation for curtailment (Lassen and Jensen 2005)
This result may be dependent upon technology. Manual curtailments require that the
ratepayer change the daily patterns of his or her life by deferring laundry or dishwashing.
Once the customer has had to change consumption patterns, it may matter less to the
customer how long the deferment lasts. The survey did not look at passive curtailments
such as temporarily changing the setpoint on a water heater. In this case, customers may
prefer more frequent and shorter interruptions. Customer preferences and available
technology will influence the ideal dispatch of demand resources.
Without a complete study of consumer preferences, it is still possible to identify a
preferable quantity and price for demand response resources. Improvements to system
cost are more dependent upon quantity than price, flattening out at Q=0.25. At each
quantity level, higher prices lead to lower demand response use but also cause more
wind curtailment and higher emissions. A price ratio of P= 1.5 favors low customer
impact as an enabler of implementation. This case (Q=0.25 P=1.5) represents favorable
tradeoffs between cost, customer impact, and emissions goals. In comparison to the
(Q=0.5 P=1.2) case discussed in section 4.2, this case achieves within 1% of the cost and
emissions outcomes at 1/3 the customer energy impact (MWh/day).
4 Survey conducted in Danish Krone at E2004 = DKK 7.44
Value, Value, DR Value, DR DR A
Criterion Unit no DR Q=0.5 P=1.2 Q=0.25 P=1.5 (/)
Cost 6/MWh 27.97 26.93 27.10 -0.7
CO2 emissions kg/MWh 166.2 160.1 161.7 +0.9
S02 emissions kg/MWh 1.09 1.05 1.06 +1.0
Wind energy fraction .280 .313 .307 -1.9
Coal energy fraction .550 .533 .539 +1.1
Natural gas energy fraction .053 .039 .039 --
DR impact MWh/day N/A 265 85 -67.9
Table 4-5: System operation evaluation criteria, with demand response
4.4 Business Impact
The system operator or regulator may be primarily concerned with the overall efficiency
or emissions of the grid, but the inclusion of robust demand response will also affect the
fortunes of generation unit owners and operators. Segmenting stakeholders into
beneficiaries and those who would be hurt helps system planners identify sources of
resistance and make accommodations. Demand response is a new business with its own
implications. Wind operators are beneficiaries of demand response, coal operators see
small changes, and natural gas generators are hurt significantly.
4.4.1 Pricing Demand Response Capacity
The business of demand response is based on bidding "generation" in the form of
reduced demand into energy markets. The curtailment services provider (CSP) pays the
end-use customer an incentive payment and retains the rest for operations and profit.
The optimization considered only a timescale on which marginal cost for dispatched
energy ("energy payments"). System operators also make "capacity payments" to have
the resource standing by and ready to curtail. Capacity payments are fixed costs paid
whether the resource is used or not (E/MW). As demand response calls can be rare,
capacity payments represent most of the income received by CSPs and their end-use
customers.
This study has heretofore focused upon the days/weeks timescale of unit commitment in
which demand response dispatch is considered only as a function of its marginal cost.
The optimization also contains enough information to calculate an annual value of
demand response capacity. A system operator must pay for every megawatt of demand
response. Since all cases with demand response saved system costs, there is a breakeven
point at which the operator is willing to pay for that capacity.
The break-even payments are expressed as:
ASystemCostmd= EnergyPaymentsdr+ CapacityPayments,
or
ASystemCostm&d = IEnergyPricer * Energydr + CapacityPricer * Capacityd
(E) (6/MWh) (MWh) (6/MW) (MW)
All terms are known for each case except Capacityr, which can be calculated from the
others. Each generator may have a different price and a different amount of use; recall
that fast-acting demand resources enjoy a price premium over those with longer lead
times. The resulting capacity calculation is an average for all generators. Capacity
payments for fast response will realistically prove to be higher and slow response will
have lower payments. Note that the calculation shows the value of capacity only during
the 8-week study period. Reported capacity payments are annualized by multiplying by
52/8. The resulting quantity represents the maximum that the system operator is willing
to pay per year for standby demand response capacity; most likely actual payments will
be less.
Plotting against the relative energy price for each case, the capacity price is surprisingly
uniform. For any given quantity of demand response resources, capacity prices remain
the same for all energy prices. The high end for capacity prices is approximately
E40k/MW-yr. This is representative for the capacity price of a peaking advanced
combustion turbine, which is about $200760k/MW-yr at a 10% carrying cost. (EIA 2009)
x 10'
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Figure 4-23: Demand response capacity price
Any capacity payment below these amounts represents an improvement to system
efficiency. Capacity price is a function of quantity. A small pool of demand resource
resources is valuable for every unit of capacity. Larger amounts of demand response
capacity are less valuable.
This quantity/capacity-price relationship defines a demand curve for the system
operator. The system operator is willing to pay a certain amount for a certain quantity of
the service. The regression below eliminates the unrealistic Q=2.0 and the null Q=O
cases.
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Figure 4-24: System operator's demand curve for DR capacity
The first few units of demand response are of great value to the system operator in terms
of reducing overall system cost. Savings are moderate, but energy payments are very
low due to lack of actual utilization. The system operator is therefore willing to pay the
small number of committed end-use customers a great deal to sign up.
The system will also display an upward-sloping "supply" curve. There will be a small
number of customers who are willing to curtail their demand for relatively small
incentive payments. As the pool of demand response grows larger, increasingly
reluctant customers must be enticed with larger capacity payments. Defining the shape
of this supply curve is beyond the scope of this study. With both the supply and demand
curves available, the optimal quantity and capacity price for demand response could be
calculated.
4.4.2 Effect of Demand Response on Electricity Price
Demand response flattens the wholesale price of electricity. When prices are high,
demand response creates a pool of "generation" resources that prevent excessive peak
prices. During off-peak hours, demand response enables fewer generators to run at their
absolute minimum levels so that prices do not become extremely low as inflexible
generators try to avoid shutdowns. Shifting load into the off-peak hours has only a small
influence on flattening the price. See Figure E-4 for a comparison of hourly day-ahead
prices with load shifting and load clipping demand response; note that prices are still
elevated at night even without an increase in load.
In the following figure, the left chart compares the hourly day-ahead price for each hour
of the "No DR" simulation with the corresponding hour in the (Q= 1.2 P=0.5)
simulation. The right chart shows averages for each hour. Time of day is represented in
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Figure 4-25: Effect of demand response upon day-ahead electricity prices
Demand response has a similar flattening effect on intra-day prices as well. Note the left
edge of the left chart. It has a row of zero intra-day prices primarily in the evening
hours. These are almost entirely eliminated as demand response leaves fewer thermal
units operating at minimum capacity overnight.
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The price behavior of the system has a great impact on the ability of thermal generators
to realize profits, especially those that depend upon peak midday prices. This will be
shown in detail in a discussion of natural gas generator profitability.
4.4.3 Effect of Demand Response upon Wind Generator Profit
The following analysis compares profit for generator owners across different fuel classes,
starting with wind farms. It calculates profit by summing all revenue sources and
subtracting cost sources for each individual generator unit. Revenue sources are
determined by day-ahead electricity payments, incoming intra-day electricity payments,
and ancillary services revenue. Combined heat and power (CHP) units also receive
revenue from heat production. Costs are a function of outgoing intra-day electricity
payments, fuel cost, operation & maintenance, and startup/shutdown cost. Results are
then averaged to obtain profit by generator fuel class. Note that heat-only units are
excluded from the analysis. In the following charts, profits and energy production are
expressed as a ratio relative to the No DR base case.
The following figure shows the amount of wind energy produced and the profit realized
for wind energy producers under each of the demand response scenarios. Figure 4-18
showed that increased quantity and decreased cost of demand response leads to less
curtailment of wind. This chart also shows the effect that increased production has upon
profits.
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Figure 4-27: Impact of demand response upon wind generator profit and production
Wind plants have no startup cost, no fuel cost, and no operation & maintenance cost in
the model. Their profits are simply a function of electricity quantity sold and the price at
the time. Demand response increases production of wind power, especially at night. It
also increases energy prices at night through increased efficiency of thermal unit
dispatch5. Wind generator owners benefit from both effects, as shown by the fact that
profit rises faster than quantity as demand response enables greater production.
4.4.4 Effect of Demand Response on Coal Generator Profit
Coal represents the main dispatchable resource on the grid. As wind increases, coal
production drops. However, demand response enables coal plants to avoid shutdowns









0.9O (.97 0.96 0.99 1
Coal energy contrauMon
Figure. 4-28: Impact of demand response upon coal generator profit and production
Profits for coal operators track production levels from Figure 4-21. For cases for Q=0.25
and Q=0.50 gross production drops 2.5% while profits drop 4.0%. In most cases, coal
generators benefit from reduced start/stop cycling. Coal generators tend to operate 24
hours per day, so the price smoothing effect of demand response provides benefit and
harm. As stakeholders, owners of coal generation plants may not gain with demand
response, but will not lose much either.
' Note that load clipping (as opposed to load shifting) demand response still elevates
prices during off-peak hours. This upward-bending curve should persist across demand
response modeling classes. Increased off-peak demand represents a relatively small part
of price differences during off-peak hours.
4.4.5 Effect of Demand Response upon Natural Gas Generator Profit
Natural gas and demand response are substitutable for each other in the short run.
Natural gas generation has a high marginal cost and is only called when prices are
elevated. The profit calculation here takes place only on the day-to-day timescale and
does not include the annual capacity payments or ancillary services payments from
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Figure 4-29: Impact of demand response upon natural gas generator profit
Electricity production profits from were never high in the natural gas generator industry
even before the introduction of demand response. With demand response, natural gas
operators suffer under the double effects of reduced supply calls (Figure 4-22) and
reduced peak prices (Figure 4-25). Since gas plants do not tend to operate during off-
peak hours, they do not benefit from the price increasing effects of demand response at
night. The compounded effects of a 20-40% volume reduction and reduced peak prices
reduce profits to near or even below zero.
Generators may suffer economically if demand response creates a more even load
profile. Generators may have high prices from peak-price days built into their revenue
structure. With these windfall days gone, generators may be required to bid higher prices
to preserve profit margins. This situation was validated experimentally in PJM (Holland
and Mansur 2005) when demand response reduced profits for oil (59%) and gas (34%)
generators. (Ruff 2003) characterizes this as a wealth transfer from generators to
consumers and speculates that the generators may take market and lobbying action to
preserve rents. In the long term, the presence of demand response on the system may
depress investment and lead to less peaking unit capacity. The remaining peaking unit
operators may be able to operate profitably in an environment with less thermal peaking
unit competition.
Transmission, distribution, and retail providers may also experience disincentives to
support demand response. The 10% of generation infrastructure that serves peak demand
is also reflected in transmission and distribution. If demand response causes loads to
level, transmission and distribution companies would see a one-time reduction to their
required capital expenditures until growth catches up with the amount saved by peak
shaving. Since transmission and distribution companies are remunerated primarily by
capital expenditures, they may see demand response as a threat to their revenue.
Demand resources may be used longer than the 10-minute runtime of spinning reserve
but cannot run indefinitely like a quick-start plant; customers will eventually want to
turn their air conditioning back on. The addition of demand response to the grid may
make it unprofitable to run these quick-start plants and harm long-term stability. These
flexible generation resources must be a continued part of the energy mix, as they have
capabilities that demand response does not. As stakeholders, flexible plant operators can
be expected to oppose demand response since it harms their direct interests. Demand
response is an imperfect substitute for this capacity; their concerns must be addressed.
5 Conclusions
The purpose of this study was to investigate the ability of responsive demand to balance
the electrical grid when intermittent renewable resources are present. The WILMAR
stochastic unit commitment model was used to represent a version of the Danish
electricity and heat system with an enhanced level of wind generation. The study found
that demand response reduced system operation cost by enabling less curtailment of
wind power. This was accomplished through more efficient use of thermal resources;
fewer thermal plants ran at their operating minimums during off-peak hours, which
allowed turbines to harvest extra wind instead of shedding it. Greater wind penetration
and more efficient thermal unit operation also reduced CO 2 and SO2 emissions. Thermal
units such as coal and natural gas ran more efficiently, with fewer startups/shutdowns
and less time spent at minimum operating levels.
The operating metrics were more influenced by the quantity of demand response
resources than their pricing. Quantity was expressed as a fraction of nameplate wind
power. Demand resources representing 25% of nameplate wind power were a promising
recommended quality level. At 10% the grid did not see much effect. At 50% and above
the improvements were small but the customer impact is great. A marginal operating
price of 150% that of a gas turbine provided a good balance of system improvement and
customer impact. The system cost benefits of each study case enabled the calculation of
a demand curve representing the system operator's willingness to pay fixed costs for
capacity.
The business impact on incumbent power plant operators was mixed. Wind farm
operators saw a -10% increase in output and a -15% increase in profits. Day-ahead
prices rose at night and fell at peak hours. Coal plant operators experienced a slight
decline in output and profit. Demand response impacted operators of flexible generation
resources such as natural gas especially hard. By substituting for their generation and
depressing peak prices, natural gas operators suffered 35% drops in output and over 90%
decreases in profit. Flexible generators will be important to the future stability of the
grid, as demand response is limited in ways that generators are not. Implementing
demand response will require measures to ensure the continued investment in and
availability of peaking generators.
This study focused on the producer side of the equation, quantifying the benefits of
demand response to system operators and generators. It estimated the impact of demand
response on customers, but does not provide tools to value that impact. A follow-up
study should use behavioral economics to determine ratepayer willingness to curtail and
determine the optimal level of demand response. This abstract model can then drive a
political analysis of the practical steps needed to implement robust demand response.
The demand response model studied here was strictly based on a predictable load-
shifting model. In reality, demand response is not as controllable as the study suggests. If
demand response does not supply as much load reduction as planned, the optimization
may need to have additional standby resources ready to supply power. The influence of
stochasticity in demand response for unit commitment is a parameter worthy of
additional study.
With high levels of unpredictable renewable resources and limited ability to import
power, demand response represents a promising technique to balance the grid at low
cost.
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Figure A-3: Wind/demand profile, 2 weeks of autumn
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Figure C-2: Demand response and flexible power, substitution elasticity
Appendix D: Startup Frequency by Fuel Type
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Figure D-1: Coal unit startup counts with demand response
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Figure D-2: Natural gas unit startup counts with demand response
Appendix E: Demand Response Modeled as Load Clipping
The experiments described in section 4.2 all use demand response as a load shifting
resource (see section 2.1.3 for more information). Demand response may also be
modeled as a load clipping resource, as described in section 2.1.2.
For the purposes of comparison, a set of simulations were run with demand response
modeled as a clipping rather than a shifting resource. No external constraints were
placed upon duration or frequency of calls. Andersen et al. (2006) modeled both load
clipping and load shifting demand response in the same simulation, recommending that
load clipping DR have a higher price. This comparison investigates a Q=0.5 case with
P=1.2 for load shifting DR and P=1.7 for load clipping DR.
Plotting the generation mix with load clipping DR, there is no "rebound" effect. Demand
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Figure E-1: Unit commitment with peak clipping
This chart plots average energy dispatch by hour. This verifies that load clipping is used
more during midday peak load and less at night.
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Figure E-2: Load shifting vs load clipping by hour
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Rather than averaging by hour, the following chart plots comparable per-day averages.
Each circle represents a single day within the study period. The left chart displays the
energy intensity of demand calls. The right chart shows the duration of those same calls.
Dashed lines are averages.
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Figure E-3: Load shifting vs. load clipping by day
Peak clipping curtails 26% more energy each day, and events are 29% longer. The same
days with high load shifting intensity have low load clipping intensity. Conversely, days







which both both demand response methods are used with great intensity. The
optimization may be using the resources for different ends. It is possible that both
demand response methods may coexist in the same system and address different
problems.
Other demand response prices were simulated, but not investigated in depth. With
P=2.0, load clipping demand response is only called one hour per day on 3 separate
days. This is so infrequent that it is not compelling to study. With P= 1.2, load clipping
demand response is called an average of 13.4 hours per day and is active for 53 of the 56
simulation days. This is so frequent that it violates the duration restrictions and is not
valid to study.
Demand response as load clipping has a similar effect on day-ahead prices as load
shifting. This shows that the increased nighttime prices with load shifting DR are more
an effect of improved thermal unit utilization and less an effect of increased off-peak
demand. The minimum price with load shifting is about 16E/MWh, the minimum price
with load clipping is about 15E/MWh, and the minimum price with no demand
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Appendix F: The Value of Perfect Information
WILMAR's stochastic unit commitment model optimizes response for 12 possible future
scenarios at each 3-hour rolling decision period. Generation choices are robust to
forecast error, but are rarely optimal for the realized wind level. With perfect
information, it is necessary only to optimize the system for the known future. This
section compares the portfolio of demand response cases in the stochastic and perfect-
information deterministic operating modes.
Value, Value, Value (DR),
Stochastic, Perfect Info, Stochastic,
Criterion Unit no DR no DR (Q=0.25 P=1.5)
Cost E/MWh 27.97 27.57 27.10
CO 2 emissions kg/MWh 166.2 163.68 160.2
SO2 emissions kg/MWh 1.09 1.07 1.06
Wind energy fraction .28 .30 .31
Coal energy fraction .55 .54 .54
Natural gas energy fraction .05 .05 .04
Demand response impact MWh/day N/A N/A 85
Table F-1: System operation evaluation criteria, with perfect information
Perfect information leads to system improvements for cost and emissions, but demand
response shows even better results. Comparing the demand response portfolio in both
the perfect-information and stochastic case, it is seen that system performance
approaches equivalence as more demand response is added. The 1.5% cost advantage of
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Figure F-1: System cost with and without perfect information
Similarly wind penetration is higher in all cases with perfect information, but the
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Figure F-2: Wind energy with and without perfect information
